INTRODUCTION
Investing, especially by institutions, can increasingly take advantage of artificial intelligence, nonlinear chaotic models, genetic algorithms, neural network time series forecasting, pattern recognition software, and sophisticated quantitative computer valuation models. 1 Thus, it seems that investing could become progressively more like the behavior described by the rational actor model of law and economics. But, even for institutions, ultimately humans are responsible for investing and feel emotions during investing. Yet, the rational actor model postulates that humans unemotionally maximize expected utility functions. 2 Behavioral economics advances an alternative to expected utility theory, namely prospect theory. 3 The fact that Professor Kahneman was the co-recipient of the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to is the latest example of the ascendancy of behavioral economics. 4 Behavioral economics has gained much popularity and prestige in recent years. 5 MONEY (1936) is the "progenitor of the modern behavioral finance view of asset markets"); Roger Loewenstein, Exuberance is Rational Or At Least Human, NY TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001 § 6 (Magazine), at 66-71 (reporting on Richard Thaler's pioneering contributions to behavioral economics); Louis Uchitelle, Following the Money, but Also the Mind: Some Economists Call Behavior a Key, NY TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001 § 3 (Money & Business), at 1, 11 (reporting on the hiring by the economics departments of Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology of young behavioral economists). 6 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998) (providing a novel behavioral economics justification for using legal rules to redistribute income); Christine legal scholars consider the policy and regulatory implications of cognitive limitations by drawing on a literature about information processing errors. 7 But, the scope and normative implications of such legal applications remains the subject of continuing debate. 8 In addition, while prospect theory provides an alternative model of choice under risk to expected utility theory; prospect theory, expected utility theory, and "virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist." 9 But, human behavior is not only cognitive, but also emotional; 10 moreover, cognition and emotion are interrelated. 11 For example, investors may be overconfident due to hubris. Yet, "research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, … show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior." 12 Behavioral finance, which is behavioral economics over time and under conditions of risk, has revolutionized academic finance. 13 But, while behavioral finance sometimes refers to such emotions as greed and fear, behavioral finance only considers emotions to explain why some investors utilize cognitive biases and heuristics. 14 The main focus of behavioral finance is to demonstrate how investing driven by cognitive limitations explains observed anomalies in asset pricing and impacts asset pricing. 15 Emotion As An Aid To Bounded Rationality, 23 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (2002) (arguing that emotions assist people in processing information); J. MARK G. WILLIAMS, ET AL., COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND EMOTIONAL DISORDERS 2-4 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the relationship between cognition and emotion). 12 Loewenstein, supra note 9 at .267. 13 For example, many individuals and even some financial practitioners over-react to information as well as to what they believe others will do. 16 Some behavioral finance models assume there are noise traders, who are unable to differentiate between payoff-irrelevant information (that is, noise) and payoff-relevant information, due usually to cognitive biases in processing information. 17 Recently, scholars have begun to consider the implications of cognitive biases for securities regulation. 18 This chapter builds upon such legal scholarship that focuses primarily on cognitive biases and heuristics by focusing instead on emotional investing. Most U.S. federal securities laws focus on the cognitive form and content of certain information. 19 In contrast, many investors respond emotionally to both the form and content of information and while investing, experience a series of "successive emotional states of hope, joy, craving and euphoria," 20 sometimes followed by anxiety and fear. It is thus not surprising that a moment of introspection reveals that people usually feel many emotions before, during, and after they invest. In fact, certain emotions might exemplify visceral factors that short circuit or trump 16 (1941) (stating that the fundamental purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors by mandating full disclosure of the information that is thought necessary for investors to make informed investment decisions); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F.Supp. 544, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating "that without complete, accurate and intelligible information about a company, investors cannot make intelligent investment decisions with regard to its securities"). normal logical reasoning. 21 For example, an investor feeling exuberant may optimistically misperceive or even ignore completely the risk factors associated with a particular security during her investment decision process. Similarly, an investor who feels anxious over a string of accounting scandals and instances of corporate malfeasance may pessimistically misperceive or even ignore completely any sound fundamentals associated with a particular security during her investment decision process. This chapter analyzes the regulatory implications of irrational exuberance and anxiety in securities markets.
People usually answer the question, "what is emotion?" with these synonyms: affect, feelings, or mood. 22 Even today, the precise definition of an emotion remains contested among researchers. 23 But, there is a consensus that emotions involve a number of related characteristics, namely great intensity, instability, relative brevity, and a partial perspective. 24 Before proceeding further, it helps to distinguish among these three related but distinct concepts: emotions, affect, and mood. Emotions describe particular states, like fear, anger, or happiness, that are "intense, short-lived, and usually have a definite cause and clear cognitive content." 25 Affect refers to "a feeling state that people experience, such as happiness or sadness. It may also 20 be viewed as a quality (e.g. goodness or badness) associated with a stimulus." 26 Mood refers to "a feeling (such as having the blues) that is low in intensity, can last for a few minutes or several weeks, has no object or has fleeting objects, and does not have to have a specific antecedent cause or cognitive content." 27 Scholars often describe the stock market as experiencing (bipolar) mood swings. 28 There is experimental evidence that happy and sad moods have large and consistent effects on estimating subjective probabilities of positive and negative events. 29 There are (at least) two principal alternative ways to conceive of emotions. First, there is a tradition dating back to Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato that conceives of emotions as factors that disturb rational deliberation, thought, and reflection. 30 Second, there is a more recent view informed by cognitive neuroscience that conceives of emotions as factors that complement rationality in effective decision-making. 31 Naturally, these different conceptions of emotions have diametrically opposed implications for whether and if so, how the law can or should respond to emotional human behavior. The first viewpoint implies that law should be designed to protect us from our emotions, 32 while the second viewpoint implies that law should take a more laissez faire attitude towards our emotions. 26 31 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 547-53 (2d ed., 2002) (describing recent research on the positive role that emotions can play in decision-making). 32 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("Where a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government . . . enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.").
Asking whether emotional decision-making is socially desirable is akin to asking whether self-interested decision-making is socially desirable. Under certain strong conditions, including but not limited to complete markets and perfect competition, the pursuit of self-interest can lead to socially desirable results in the sense of Pareto efficient outcomes. In other situations, including but not limited to the presence of externalities or public goods and in certain strategic interactions, the pursuit of self-interest can lead to socially undesirable results in the sense of Pareto inefficient outcomes.
Existing legal doctrines provide numerous examples of both conceptions of emotions.
Criminal law considers excuses based upon extreme emotional disturbance, the battered woman syndrome, and post-traumatic stress disorder; but it also encourages compassion, mercy, and sympathy. Tort law recognizes some, but not all forms of emotional harm and suffering.
Contract law recognizes the formation defense of procedural unconscionability, which can be due to distress, transactional incapacity, or unfair persuasion. 33 The Federal Trade Commission promulgated a rule granting consumers a three day "cooling-off period" during which buyers can rescind their contracts with door-to-door salespeople. 34 There is a similar three day cooling-off period for home equity loans providing buyers with a limited right to rescind certain credit transactions involving their principal dwelling as a security interest. 35 Congress imposed a seven day waiting period on any employee waiver of rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 36 The family law statutes of many states require that (perhaps very 33 systematically make prediction errors regarding their future interim or ex post feelings. 40 Because irrational exuberance and anxiety occur before or during the process of decision making, there are no such difficulties with irrational exuberance and anxiety.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Part I provides empirical and experimental evidence of, a case study of, and theoretical models of irrational exuberance and anxiety in securities markets. Part II contributes to the debate over mandatory securities disclosures by examining the implications of irrational exuberance and anxiety for such disclosures. Part II also develops implications of the fact that securities regulators, including but not limited to the SEC, juries, and private litigants themselves experience irrational exuberance and anxiety. Part III provides conclusions.
I. IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE AND ANXIETY IN SECURITIES MARKETS
The chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D.C., Alan Greenspan, described stock market investor behavior with the phrase "irrational exuberance" in his now media and with the public worldwide. The publication of a book entitled Irrational Exuberance cemented the permanence of that phrase in the popular lexicon about securities markets. 41 What exactly, though, does irrational exuberance mean, as opposed to rational exuberance or irrational anxiety? In this chapter, the phrase irrational exuberance refers to exuberance that is not justified by merely cognitive processing of the available information about securities markets. Thus, rational exuberance refers to exuberance that is warranted by merely cognitive processing of securities disclosures and risks. Irrational anxiety refers to anxiety that is unwarranted by merely cognitive analyses of securities markets fundamentals. Rational anxiety refers to anxiety that is supported by merely cognitive assessments of the costs and benefits of securities investing.
Most people at some point during investing experience fear or hope over their investments. People often make investments motivated by fears. There is the fear of losing money. 42 There is the fear of not keeping up with others or being left out of a bull market. 43 The fear of regret also partially explains why investors often select conventional stock choices, use full-commission brokers rather than discount brokers (the former may give useless advice, but also provide easy scapegoats), and hold onto losing stocks too long. 44 People often avoid purchasing such volatile securities as those of biotech or Internet companies to minimize anxiety. 45 On the other hand, some investors, such as day traders, might engage in risky 41 ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000). 42 The robust experimental findings that people can be very loss averse and treat out-of-pocket losses differently than opportunity costs have clear implications for the way that people actually invest. 43 learning effects and thus dampen irrational exuberance and anxiety in a manner analogous to how framing dampens endowment effects in corporate agency contexts. 51 But, irrational exuberance and anxiety are not really biases to be unlearned.
Selection effects occur if securities market pressures weed out irrational exuberance and anxiety. Even when some investors continue to feel irrational exuberance and anxiety over time, perhaps the overall impact of irrational exuberance and anxiety on securities markets will decrease over time due to arbitrage. It might seem that arbitrage is a powerful force that selects for (more) rational investing decision-making and weeds out irrational exuberance and anxiety.
But, as is well-known by now, there are costs and limits to arbitrage. 52 Also, arbitrage is a strong engine of information transfer that travels in two directions. In other words, just as those investors who do not feel irrational exuberance and anxiety can arbitrage away the impact of those investors who do feel irrational exuberance and anxiety, similarly those investors who feel irrational exuberance and anxiety can arbitrage away the impact of those investors who do not feel irrational exuberance and anxiety. The often cited observation that securities markets are the archetypical model of perfectly competitive markets is a true, but moot point if even institutional, professional, or sophisticated investors also feel irrational exuberance and anxiety. In fact, there is anthropological, economic, ethnographic, and sociological evidence that documents how the corporate cultures of many institutional investors foster irrational exuberance and anxiety. 53 Finally, recent empirical evidence finds that securities market professionals feel the same 51 emotions as individual investors do. 54 Finally, there is anecdotal evidence that even institutional investors feel strong emotions over their investments. 55 Although securities markets are highly competitive, valuation in securities markets is an extremely subjective process. Emotional factors often influence the assessment of securities values across investors, just as emotions often affect subjective appraisals of the value of residential properties across home-buyers and homeowners. In fact, because securities, unlike consumer durables and real estate, are never consumed; securities markets, even more than other durable goods markets, involve subjective, often ephemeral and potentially very emotional anticipations of the future. While reasonable people may agree on the past and the present (although there is reason to be skeptical of even these propositions as evidenced by the wellknown fallibility of eyewitness testimony and memory), reasonable people often disagree on the future, both in terms of the set of contemplated outcomes and their various relative likelihoods.
People are repeatedly caught off guard upon the realization of previously subjectively unforeseen contingencies.
Even before the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act in 1934 were enacted, and certainly ever since then, it would not be surprising to note that many emotional factors affect investor behavior. The legislative history of both Acts that are the centerpiece of 
significant correlation between electrodermal responses and transient market events, and
between changes in cardiovascular variables and market volatility. These data suggest that an important factor in the success of some derivative securities traders is their ability to utilize their emotions to make very rapid trading decisions. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that even professional traders react emotionally to financial decisions, information, and outcomes. 77
A number of empirical studies document a statistically significant effect of weather on stock market prices. 78 year. 82 A different approach studies the relationship between stock returns and temperature. 83 Another study finds that on average, morning stock returns exceed afternoon returns. 84 All of these studies imply that the moods of individual investors or professional market-makers affect stock prices. 85 In addition, there is empirical evidence that unusually high levels of geomagnetic storms (GMS) have a statistically and economically significant negative impact on world and country-specific stock returns, even after controlling for behavioral, environmental, and wellknown market seasonal factors. 86 Finally, other studies speculate that there is a lunar cycle, also known as the circatrigintan cycle, effect in stock prices whereby stock returns are significantly higher on days near a new moon than on days near a full moon. 87
A CASE STUDY OF IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE: ON-LINE BROKERAGE ADS
A case study of irrational exuberance is provided by emotional on-line investing advertisements that presented visceral and powerful images of on-line investors getting rich quickly. Some individuals exposed to such emotionally appealing on-line brokerage television commercials and billboards are likely to ignore or be insensitive to variations in the probability 82 [M]any investors are susceptible to quixotic euphoria… ." 96 New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer observed that on-line brokerage ads "conveys a message of convenience, speed, easy wealth, and the risk of 'being left behind' in the on-line era." 97 Like much advertising, these advertisements do not provide information for viewers to process cognitively, as much as they appeal to viewers' emotions. 98 These commercials were directed at evoking strong positive mental imagery and favorable emotional reactions to on-line investing risks. Such on-line brokerage ads decreased significantly after the bull market ended, further suggesting that the goals of such commercials were primarily to complement an overall mood of irrational exuberance and euphoria that prevailed then in securities markets and to stir up such emotions as hope and greed. 99 In a Jan. 26, 2001 report about on-line trading, the SEC expressed concerns that certain types of aggressive on-line brokerage ads may cause investors to possess unrealistic expectations over the risks and rewards of investing. 100 In that report, the SEC noted that "[a]dvertising that contains misrepresentations or omissions of material fact may violate the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws." 101 In 2000 and 2001, the SEC and NASD (National Association of Securities Dealers) formally investigated the advertising practices of E*Trade Group, Inc. 102 But, both lengthy investigations resulted in the SEC dropping its fair disclosure case and the NASD settling with E*Trade. 103 The SEC did not publicly state the reasons for its decision to drop the case. Although there is little concern over such types of advertisements in the current anxious securities market environment, similar advertisements may return when an exuberant securities market environment does. In addition, there may be cause for concern over advertisements that exploit investor anxiety in a bear market. 104 Furthermore, SEC releases already express concern over the advertising of such There are many other securities areas where investing is more likely to be driven by emotional reactions to rather than cognitive processing of financial risks and information. The analysis of this chapter applies to such areas for drawing legal policy implications that differ 105 t]he law is not made for experts but to protect the public,--that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general impressions"); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7 th Cir. 1942) (stating "the buying public does not ordinarily carefully study or weigh each word in an advertisement" and that "[a]dvertisements are intended not 'to be carefully dissected with a dictionary at hand, but rather to produce an impression upon' prospective purchasers" (quoting Newton Tea & Spice Co. v. United States, 288 F. 475, 479 (6th Cir. 1923))); Standard Oil Co. of California v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating "that commercial messages might lead the average viewer, in his anxiety …, to overreact even though upon careful reflection he might see for himself the limitations inherent in the advertiser's claim"). 107 An advertisement is deceptive when there is "a misrepresentation, omission or other practice, that misleads the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment. from those based on unemotional investing. One such area is day trading, 110 and emotional advertisements for day trading. 111 Financial scams by con artists are another such area. 112 Examples of such financial scams are so-called "prime bank programs," which promise incredible returns from investing in "prime bank" securities. 113 Another example of such a financial scam is that of so-called affinity fraud, which is targeted at members of such identifiable groups as ethnic minorities and religious groups. 114
B. THEORETICAL MODELS
Neoclassical economic theory already incorporates certain emotions in several ways.
First, love or hate can be treated as part of an individual's tastes or non-monetary utility in the sense of interdependent individual preferences. 115 Second, certain emotional reactions function as commitment devices in multi-person decision environments. 116 Third, game theory can accommodate emotions that depend on probability beliefs about strategic behavior. 117 Recently, several economists have urged their fellow economists to study emotions more in their models. 118 A survey of how economic theory views emotions illustrates this renewed interest. 119 That survey, however, criticized the interpretation of emotions as psychic benefits and costs or as merely a source of preferences because such interpretations ignore how emotions affect the ability to make rational choices. 120 This chapter addresses this criticism by explicitly analyzing irrational exuberance and anxiety in securities investing. Applying this model to suspense and gambling yields the empirically supported prediction that people will bet on their emotional favorites in a sporting event. 123 This model is also rich enough to analyze preferences over illusions and the dilemma that a doctor faces about whether to give her patient (more than legally required) detailed information concerning an upcoming medically benign, but subjectively threatening diagnostic surgical procedure. 124 (1975) (reporting that in a study of forty two primiparas and primigravidas in their last trimester of pregnancy, childbirth information from Childbirth Education Association classes and Red Cross prenatal classes reduced significantly measures of anxiety, fear, and self-reported perceptions of pain in labor and delivery, controlling for the amount of anesthesia).
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY AND ANTICIPATORY FEELINGS
required rate of return than if that security did not cause its owners to experience anxiety. 127 This model also formally demonstrates that the price of a riskless security is greater than it would be in a world in which investors do not experience anxiety because riskless securities provide the benefit of anxiety reduction. 128 prices. 133 The model predicts that, all by itself, a 0.10 percent fluctuation in the beliefs of investors regarding the discount factor can generate a 3-4 percent standard deviation in stock prices. 134 The model also finds a similarly important, but smaller effect on the standard deviation of stock prices due to a fluctuation in risk attitudes. 135 that arise from such images will be insensitive to changes in probability. An investor's mental image of what it will be like to participate in an IPO of stock is likely to be approximately the same whether the probability of that stock skyrocketing is 1 in 100,000 or 1 in 100,000,000. In contrast, an investor's mental image of what it will be like to participate in a stock IPO that skyrockets will likely be very different from that investor's mental image of what it will be like to participate in a stock IPO that only has a very modest increase.
THE RISK-AS-FEELINGS HYPOTHESIS

THE "HOW-DO-I-FEEL-ABOUT-IT" HEURISTIC
Experimental results and clinical phenomena demonstrate that emotional reactions are fairly independent of, often impervious to, and precede in time, cognitive judgments. 139
Evolutionary forces may explain why affect precedes cognition. 140 A recent study found that "affective processes play a critical role in determining choices and that these affective processes may sometimes influence choice without the decision maker's awareness." 141 A large body of empirical psychological research finds that affective impressions attach to images and those affective impressions influence judgments and decisions. 142 A recent theoretical framework emphasizes the importance of an affect or "how-do-Ifeel-about-it" heuristic in guiding decisions and judgments. 143 People utilize this heuristic when they come to have an emotional, all-things-considered, reaction to make judgments. People utilizing this heuristic essentially ask "how-do-I-feel-about-something" and utilize their answer as the basis for making their judgment about something. 144 The affect or how-do-I-feel-about-it" heuristic is related to the mood-as-information hypothesis. This hypothesis argues that people's moods informs their decisions, even when the causes of those moods are unrelated to their decisions. This phenomenon is known as misattribution. It explains how and why nominally irrelevant feelings or what the famous macroeconomist, Keynes called "animal spirits" influence securities investing. 145
The "how-do-I-feel-about-it" heuristic explains public concerns about health and environmental risks, high punitive damage awards, and people's reactions to contested political events. 146 The "how-do-I-feel-about-it" heuristic is related to the dual process theory that people process information via two parallel, interactive modes. 147 The first is a rational, deliberative, and analytical system employing such rules of logic and evidence as probability theory. The second is an experiential system that encodes reality in terms of images, metaphors, and narratives that are imbued with affect and feelings. There is much experimental evidence that a empirical evidence, and discussing manipulation of affect); Cass R. person's mood influences which of these two information-processing strategies a person utilizes. 148 The Affect Infusion Model (AIM) argues that the extent to which people rely on their feelings to make decisions depends on how abstract, risky, and uncertain those decisions are. 149 Usually, people who are in rationality utilize high affect infusion strategies (HAIS) in highly complex decisions, such as securities investing. Emotions form a major input of decisions made via HAIS. People usually employ low affect infusion strategies (LAIS) in decisions requiring "little generative constructive processing." 150 So, LAIS are more appropriate for decisions that are familiar and low in complexity than for decisions that are infrequent and high in complexity.
II. MANDATORY SECURITIES DISCLOSURES
"Mandatory disclosure is a -if not the -defining characteristic of U.S. securities regulation." 151 The Supreme Court stated that the "fundamental purpose" of federal securities regulations "was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor … ." 152 In another famous case, the Supreme Court stated the Securities Act of 1933 and its mandatory disclosure requirements were designed "to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions. There is a long-standing debate over the purpose and effectiveness of mandatory securities disclosure. 155 An often-cited purpose is to improve the informational efficiency of securities prices. 156 Critics of this accuracy enhancement efficiency justification argue that mandatory securities disclosure has not achieved this purpose. 157 Professor Mahoney proposes as an alternative efficiency justification for mandatory securities disclosure reducing the agency costs that arise between investors and promoters and between corporate managers and their shareholders. 158 Both of these justifications of mandatory securities disclosures focus on the cognitive impacts of increased disclosures.
Mandatory disclosures generate not only information, but also such emotions as perhaps anxiety, embarrassment, euphoria, exuberance, feeling stupid, relief, or shame. For example, mandating disclosure of the realistically very low odds of winning a lottery and the present discounted value of the after-tax prize winnings produces no benefits if such disclosures fail to reduce the number of lottery ticket buyers, but cause lottery players to feel dumb or foolish and reduce their pleasure from daydreaming about possible future riches. Such emotional consequences of mandatory disclosure can alter behavior. For example, the display by retailers of detailed facts about food content mandated by food labeling acts may result in the so-called "Snackwell Effect," named for the fat-free cookie that appears to lead to greater consumption. 159 Emotional reactions to securities risks imply emotional reactions to securities information because information is in essence the negative of risk as information involves the reduction of risk danger that over time people become desensitized to many non-specific disclosures, so that a more specific disclosure may fall on deaf ears. Broad and general disclosures also lack the vividness of more specific and narrowly focused disclosures.
Securities disclosures function not only as information and marketing documents, but also as protection from civil liability for securities fraud. Even though there is no analogous marketing role for disclosures about possible terrorist attacks; after Sept. 11, 2001, the U.S.
federal government is concerned with a severe public relations penalty for non-disclosures about possible terrorist attacks that is analogous to liability for fraudulent securities non-disclosures.
Another difference between securities disclosures and disclosures about potential terrorist attacks is their actual or intended audience. Some legal scholars believe and argue that the investing public is neither the actual nor intended audience for the disclosures that federal securities laws mandate. 162 Instead, these commentators feel that professional analysts are the audience of much of the accounting and financial disclosures that federal securities regulations mandate.
Professional analysts filter that information onto the investing public. 163 Because analysts are professionals who have repeated experience at interpreting such disclosures, they may seem less likely than inexperienced and unsophisticated individuals to feel irrational exuberance and anxiety as the result of securities disclosures. 164 But, precisely because of their experience with other similar securities in the past, professional analysts may have more vivid reactions to securities disclosures than laypersons lacking any personal or direct knowledge of similar cases.
Because of their compensation, there may also be serious conflicts of interests between professional analysts and the investing public that mean analysts could routinely make unjustifiably optimistic or irrationally exuberant securities recommendations. 165 The debate over mandatory disclosure in federal securities regulation ignores the emotional benefits or costs of such disclosures, in particular, irrational exuberance and anxiety that potential and existing investors may feel due to disclosures or their absence. Such emotional benefits or costs affect both individuals in terms of increased or reduced social utility and issuers of securities in terms of a lower or higher cost of capital due to such emotional reactions. The heterogeneity of people's emotional reactions to mandatory securities disclosures complicates if and how securities regulations should take irrational exuberance and anxiety into account. The extent to which different people feel irrational exuberance and anxiety from securities disclosures affects the socially optimal amount of those disclosures. Even holding the content of disclosed information fixed, anxiety has implications for the form or presentation of that information.
Because irrational exuberance and anxiety depends more on the possibility than on the probability of certain outcomes, some people may overreact in their securities investments to disclosures about material events with positive, but small probabilities of occurrence. Irrational 168 An analogy is to a patient's fears and behavior in the medical disclosure context. A patient may imagine and fear the worst if a physician does not disclose certain information about medical risks in a timely fashion. In other words, in both financial and medical contexts, people may infer or imagine bad news from silence and experience fear or anxiety from not knowing enough information.
The above observation helps to explain why some people react with irrational anxiety over companies not expensing stock options utilized to compensate and provide incentives for their executives. 169 Not knowing how much those stock options actually cost a company may lead both existing and potential investors to overestimate the cost of granting such executive stock options and experience irrational anxiety from such overestimates or from just not knowing. On the other side of the emotional spectrum from irrational anxiety due to lack of disclosure is possible irrational exuberance or unjustified excitement. In the case of the bull market of the late 1990's, many investors evaluated companies in the so-called "new economy" based more on irrational exuberance and irrational euphoria than on fundamental analysis.
The key legal policy questions are thus what can and should we do about irrational exuberance and anxiety. 170 The Brady Commission formed to examine the 1987 stock market crash advocated circuit breakers to "cushion the impact of market movements, which would otherwise damage market infrastructures." 171 In 1988, U.S. securities exchanges adopted trading halts to essentially provide investors a cooling-off period if the Dow Jones Industrial Average index fell too much too fast. 172 It is perhaps no surprise that emotional regulating not only happens, but also systematically differs from unemotional regulating. The social desirability of emotional 178 Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L. REV. 713, 742 (1995) (pointing out how trend-chasing investors will misinterpret or ignore mandatory disclosures). 179 Choi & Pritchard, supra note 18 (cataloging a series of cognitive biases that may affect SEC officials). 180 regulating, including but not limited to zealous advocates, passionate public servants, possibly envious or sympathetic regulators, and ideologically fanatical prosecutors, is a difficult question.
But, whether or not emotional regulating is socially desirable, it not only exists, but also is likely to continue. In light of the realities of emotional regulating, the SEC in general and its mandatory disclosure regime in particular might do more harm than good and yet persist due to emotional appeal, rationales, and considerations. The history of U.S. federal securities regulation from its very inception in the aftermath of the Great Depression to its most recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the aftermath of Enron, Arthur Anderson, Rite Aid, Worldcom, Tyco, Adelphia, Merck, and Global Crossing is that of (possibly benign) neglect of securities markets interrupted by legislation in response to political and public pressure arising from highly visceral and public episodes of banking, corporate, or securities fraud and scandals. 181 Mandatory disclosure might be at best, an impotent, and at worst, a socially harmful regulatory policy if the majority of investors experience cognitive biases and utilize heuristics in the processing of information and/or feel irrational exuberance and anxiety before and during their investing process. But, the SEC's obsession with mandatory disclosure may be due to its emotional resonance with the metaphor of a "level playing field" and the rationale of protecting investors from others and possibly themselves. An important question for legal policy is to what extent education or experience mitigates irrational exuberance and anxiety. After all, not only did many individual and novice investors lose money by investing heavily in high-technology and internet stocks during the 1990's, but so did many hedge funds and mutual funds managed by financially sophisticated and experienced investors. 182 To the extent that individuals are more evolutionarily prepared for certain emotions than others, it may be neither easy nor socially desirable to alter irrational exuberance and anxiety in response to securities disclosures. 183 Whether more paternalistic securities regulation than our current federal system of mandatory disclosure is socially desirable depends on to what extent and how others can improve upon the behavior and performance resulting from irrational exuberance and anxiety. 184 Indeed, if we suspect that most investing is driven by irrational exuberance and anxiety, then securities regulation should focus primarily on emotional reactions to, instead of unemotional processing of, the form and content of mandatory disclosures. If we believe that short of explicit and prices reflect the private information of those "irrational" investors. 187 But, under a general equilibrium analysis, the price impact and survival of "irrational" investors are two related, yet quite distinct and independent concepts. 188 In other words, in a long-run equilibrium, "irrational" investors can have a significant impact on prices whether or not they survive. Moreover, even if "irrational" investors survive, they may have no price impact. In addition, such a proposal assumes the private information of "irrational" investors have high signal to noise ratios.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Although the signal to noise ratio for emotional investing is difficult to determine in general, there are clearly situations where the signal to noise ratio is low. So, for example, emotional investing caused by the on-line brokerage ads described in this chapter is likely to have a low signal to noise ratio and therefore regulating such ads is likely to not have any deleterious effect on the informational efficiency of securities prices.
